Saturday, August 9, 2014

I am facing a motion for summary judgment in Massachusetts, what is it and what should I do?



9 August 2014

A motion for summary judgment is a way a party to litigation moves (asks) a court to grant it judgment (they win) prior to a trial on the merits (where people testify in court, etc).  It is typically filed after the discovery period of litigation has ended.  That means it is filed after the parties have shared the documents and information (facts) they were required to according to the rules of civil procedure.  The standard language that you will find in most motions for summary judgment is basic enough to relay what the motion is all about, that is usually something like this: summary judgment is appropriate as materials show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the [plaintiff/defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The procedural rule permitting a motion for summary judgment is Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.

Overall, the other party is arguing that, based on the facts established, or at least not reasonably disputable, that if you applied the law to these facts, it would win.  It is also saying that there is no reason for a trial and its concomitant time and expense.  Of course, a judge would decide this motion as only a jury is assembled for a trial. 

We will break down some of the parts.  One part is that the moving party is saying that there is no “genuine” issue over material facts.  It means that a party cannot dispute something based on a position or opinion that is too speculative or simply wishful thinking unsupported by the facts.  It has been described “an issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record [facts established in case] taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the moving party.”  Brooks v. Peabody & Arnold, LLP, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 50 (2008).  This means the judge will place himself in the position of a hypothetical “trier of fact” [which means either a judge or jury that would decide the matter at trial] and consider whether any rational fact finder could rule the other way.  In other words, to allow the motion is to say, no reasonable person would think this fact is not established.

The other important question is whether all the “material” facts are established.  This means that there could be a genuine dispute over a fact, but it is not a “material” fact.    A moving party “need not prove that no factual disputes exist, only that there is no genuine dispute over a material fact.”  Town of Norwood v. Adams-Russell Co, Inc., 401 Mas. 677, 683 (1988).  The moving party is saying all the material facts, the facts that matter, are established.  It has been described that a fact is material only if it might provide a basis for a fact finder to find in favor of the nonmoving party.  Jenzabar, Inc. v. Long Bow Group, Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 649 (2012).  It has also been described that a fact is material if it has a bearing on the outcome of the case.  Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 145-46 (2006).  There are many other important issues, such as timing and evidence, when facing a motion for summary judgment that must be addressed.

Simply put, a motion for summary judgment is serious business.  If allowed, it will end the case or if it is a partial motion for summary judgment, decide at least a part of the case.  If the motion is not allowed, a trial is necessary. 

If you are facing a motion for summary, you are facing what could be the end of the road; essentially, it is now or never on whether you will obtain help.  If you need help, feel free to give this office a call.

Wednesday, July 16, 2014

In defense of Judge Robert S. Murphy Jr.’s June 11, 2014, Order finding Iheanyi D. Okoroafor in contempt of court at the Belchertown District Court.




16 July 2014

There has been much ado over the jailing of a retired 73 year-old man by Massachusetts District Court Judge Robert S. Murphy, Jr. over the failure to pay $508.27 as reported in the Boston Globe on July 2, 2014.  As a cursory review of the on-line comments about the story illustrate, not much provokes more debate than how debt collection should work and what exemptions society should allow.   Those comments also show a widespread ignorance of the basics of the debt collection process in Massachusetts.  Before attempting to defend Judge Murphy’s actions, a few basic pointers are in order.

First, yes there are no debtor’s prisons.  That means if you do not have the means to pay, you do not go to jail for failure to pay, or to force you to earn to pay through forced hard labor, for your debt.  But if you do have the means, a court can order you to pay.  And you do go to jail (as Mr. Okaroafor arguably did) for failure to obey an order.  So, yes, people can and do go to jail for not paying a debt (that our society believes you have the means to pay, as determined by a judge applying the applicable exemption laws).
 
Second, the process Mr. Okaroafor was in was not small claims court, although that apparently was the court that rendered the initial judgment, it was really the supplemental process session at work here.  This is the session where straight up this-guy-now must-pay-me type collections occur.  Typically, a creditor gets a judgment and then files a separate action in the supplemental process session if it choose that path for collections, and many do.  Sometimes, for whatever reason, the author has observed a small claims judgment obtained in the small claims session just automatically roll into supplementary process.  What this means is that in the supplementary process session, the legal fact that you owe the money has been established, and that question is off the table so to speak.

A side note is in order.  In general, pro se litigants often argue something off point at a hearing due to their lack of knowledge and understanding as to what the particular hearing they are appearing at is to decide.  Doing this indicates a lack of knowledge of procedure and can hurt the pro se litigant’s credibility to argue legal arguments.  In the supplementary process session, this translates into a pro se trying to argue the merits of the case, when, as Judge Murphy correctly stated to Mr. Okoroafor when he did this very thing, “that ship has sailed.”  It is very common occurrence in the supplementary process session to the frustration of the clerk or judge presiding.  To avoid this waste of time, for example, one of the clerks in the supplementary process session in Springfield District Court regularly announces before the session starts to all in the courtroom that it is not the place or time to argue the merits of your case.  This announcement is analogous to the no parking sign “Don’t even think of parking here” that we all see in places that are tempting to illegally park in.  The point is, day after day when pro se litigants raise this, it becomes difficult for the human beings involved, even if they are supposed to be professional lawyers, clerks, or judges, not to become frustrated.

Third, civil contempt is the act of knowingly violating a clear and direct court order that you had the ability to follow.  This is the end of the road for debtors.  And what all people need acknowledge is that society needs that force to keep it civilized.  Somehow, we all instinctively know (and must rationally acknowledge) that there has to be an end of the line, and in debt collection, it is to be jailed by civil contempt for a debt someone has the ability to pay with non-exempt income.

Now with these basics in mind, the author will turn to defending Judge Murphy’s order and then make a few equitable observations based only on a review of the on-line Boston Globe July 2, 2014, article and the audio recording of the hearing at issue.  First, it appears that there was an order already in place before Judge Murphy found Mr. Okaroafor in contempt.  The prior order required Mr. Okaroafor to make payment before the hearing and he did not comply.  And Mr. Okaroafar had been to multiple hearings involving orders to pay that he did not comply with before.  It is true that Massachusetts pension income is exempt from collection and that was the only income the debtor stated he had personally at the hearing. 
  
However, all of this about Judge Murphy not following exemption laws, and more specifically, being ignorant that Massachusetts pension income is exempt, appears not to be as deserved as reported because there is more to consider here.  Judge Murphy did not act alone.  If the contempt finding was wrong, the responsibility for it is shared with the judge that issued the prior order to pay that Judge Murphy was enforcing, as it should be safe to assume that the issue of whether Mr. Okaroafar was required and had the ability to pay was decided in the affirmative at a prior time.  We are assuming here that at the prior hearings the other judge(s) did not have adequate basis to make the order, such as learning that Mr. Okaroafor had non-exempt assets or income to satisfy this $508.27 debt.   Yes, Judge Murphy made a mistake, but he did correctly believe he had an obligation to enforce the prior judge’s order.

Second, debtors in supplementary process are required to complete a form listing their assets and income and expenses.  Did Mr. Okaroafar complete this form?  Or did he refuse?  If there was a form, what appeared on it?  Is there more information that was before Judge Murphy when he made his decision?

Third, at the hearing, Mr. Okaroafor stated as one of his expenses his wife’s medical bills.  Although it is laudable to pay your spouse’s medical bills, it can be argued that such an expense is not necessary since it is essentially a gift to an adult third party, which is not to take priority over paying a judgment creditor.  Moreover, he stated his wife had insurance and social security income, which  supports the idea that money from Mr. Okaroafor to pay the bills was not needed even if it could be considered to take priority over paying a judgment creditor.  All of this could have been in Judge Murphy’s mind that day.  So, the error of his decision was more about not realizing Mr. Okaroafor’s income was exempt, and less about his actual ability to pay.

Fourth, Mr. Okaroafor was not a help to himself.  He did what many pro se debtors do at supplementary process hearings, try and argue the merits of the case that have already been decided. In addition, the author has a hard time believing that Mr. Okaroafor was not informed prior to the hearing, if not many times at the multiple collection hearings he was afforded over the 18 months since the judgment issued, that arguing the merits of the case was off-point at these types of hearings.  There are two points here, one that by doing this he most likely lost his credibility to make a legal argument, and more importantly, if it was believed he was repeatedly told “that ship had sailed” then by raising it repeatedly he was exhibiting a refusal to follow and acknowledge rules and procedure.  Not a wise choice when being subject to a contempt hearing and facing possible incarceration for not following orders. 
 
In addition, it was Mr. Okaroafor who was supposed to advocate for himself and had the most responsibility to argue that his income was exempt, but he did not.  After 18 months of collection proceedings, he had ample notice that he would have to defend himself.   The article stated that judges should “know and apply the law correctly” when dealing with unrepresented parties.  That may be true, but it is equally true that judges are also not to be advocates for one side, but instead impartial judges.  Keep in mind that there was another pro se litigant on the other side.  Who should he favor?   The answer is neither party.  This is not to say that a judge should ignore the law when it is before him, but the point is that just how far a judge is supposed to advocate for one party and not the other is debatable and there is a point that a judge can go to far in advocating for one side.  The judge’s proper role should be considered in any debate on the subject.

Another interesting fact on this point that did not appear in the article is that Mr. Okaroafor can be heard stating that he wanted to make payment arrangements.  But this was in stark contrast to his prior statements that he could not afford to pay and after the order was issued to put him in custody.  This indicates he may have thought he could have avoided the contempt at the last minute by offering to pay, but wanted to push it until the very end. 

Lastly, Judge Murphy was not mistaken in finding that Mr. Okaroafar did not comply with the prior order; he did not make the payment by the hearing date.  According to the article, there were many orders issued requiring him to pay and he repeatedly did not comply and raised the wrong argument when questioned.  Thus, Mr. Okaroafar had many orders to pay issued against him that he did not follow.  Yes, Judge Murphy apparently considered exempt income in finding Mr. Okaroafar could have complied with the payment order, and based only on the information presented at the hearing at issue, that was legally incorrect.  But he was correct that the payment was not made.
   
Some final, non-legal common sense points are in order.  The day Mr. Okaroafar was jailed he was entering a hearing where the question of whether he was in contempt of court was to be decided.  It is clear from the audio recording that Mr. Okaroafar was unfamiliar with the legal process in general and was not adequately prepared.  (For example, he thought at one point that the Massachusetts District Attorney’s Office could represent him).  Simply put, he should not have been there.   He never should have been playing with the fire of a civil contempt hearing.  The point is that you do not let your friend or loved one enter a civil contempt hearing after they have not paid and risk ending up getting jailed over a $508.27 debt.  Why wasn't this avoided?  Where were the friends and family?  Where were they at the hearing?  Why was the debt not paid for him?  Why, at the least, was he not armed with the correct legal argument by someone with that knowledge?
  
It is easy to rest the responsibility on Judge Murphy (and the rest of the government) and his legal mistake makes a good headline for the Boston Globe, but Mr. Okaroafar, those close to him, and the entire private sector have some responsibility here.  All of us, especially those wanting to point blame on some government official, should take some of the responsibility for the unfortunate result of what happened to Mr. Okaroafar on 11 June 2014. 

Monday, June 9, 2014

Can I legally force a lender to take my house back by surrendering it in a chapter 7 bankruptcy?



9 June 2014

Answer:  As a general rule, no, but under the right circumstances and depending on the actions of the lender, there could be a possibility.

Many consumers mistakenly believe that their mortgage lender will automatically take their home if they simply stop paying.  Although it is by far the most likely result, there are times when a lender opts to not pursue foreclosure.  When this happens, the consumer remains responsible for all the incidents of home ownership.

In an effort to rid themselves of property, some consumers file bankruptcy and opt to “surrender” their homes, this being one of the three options to choose from in bankruptcy for each secured debt a debtor has.  Even utilizing the power of chapter 7 bankruptcy (chapter 13 is a separate subject) it is important to understand that the lender is not forced to foreclose, even when the consumer desires this.  The consumers/debtors in In re Canning, a decision issued by the First Circuit (which includes Massachusetts), learned this. Canning v. Beneficial Maine, Inc. (In re Canning), 706 F. 3d 64 (1st Cir. 2013).
 
To understand the In re Canning case and this subject matter, one must first understand what the effect of a chapter 7 discharge has on a secured loan.  It relieves the debtor from personal liability, but the lien against the property survives.  This means that the bank cannot sue the debtor for any deficiency that remains after the property is foreclosed on, but again, it retains its right to foreclose against the property if applicable.  11 U.S.C. § 524(a); Pratt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2006).

In In re Canning the debtors opted to surrender their home in a chapter 7 bankruptcy.  Canning v. Beneficial Maine, Inc. (In re Canning), 706 F. 3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2013).  After the case was over, the Cannings wrote to their mortgage lender and gave it two options: 1) foreclose; or 2) release its lien.  Id. at 67.  The bank refused to do either, instead it made clear it was not seeking to collect the debt personally against the debtors, but only retained its lien to enforce its right against the property.  Id.  It also said that it would consider a short sale or a negotiated settlement.  Id. This eventually meant to the First Circuit that the bank was not seeking to collect more than the value of the house, even though the mortgage amount owed was much more than that.

The Cannings eventually reopened their bankruptcy case and sought sanctions against the bank for failing to foreclose or release its lien. Canning v. Beneficial Maine, Inc. (In re Canning), 706 F. 3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2013). The Cannings relied on a case named In re Pratt, also decided by the First Circuit.  Id. at 68.  In In re Pratt an auto lender was found to have violated the discharge injunction by failing to repossess or release its title to a worthless car.  Pratt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006).  The court found that the auto lender was using its right to repossess improperly and coercing the debtor into making payments.  Id. at 19-20.  In other words the court found that the auto lender was in reality seeking to collect personally against the debtor, which as stated, is prohibited after someone gets their discharge in bankruptcy.  Part of the reason was that the debtor was unable, due to state law, to junk the car because the junk yard required all liens were released.  Since the auto lender refused, the debtors were stuck with the car seemingly indefinitely.  This is part of why the court believed the position the auto lender put the debtors was untenable and improper and amounted to coercion to get them to pay the debt.

But in In re Canning, the court saw what the bank was doing was different and permitted.  Canning v. Beneficial Maine, Inc. (In re Canning), 706 F. 3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2013). A few reasons was that the property at issue, a residential home, had value, and also was subject to value increase.  Id. at 72.  It also noted that the Cannings failed to show that they were incurring expenses by holding onto a worthless asset, as the debtors in In re Pratt did.  Id. at 71.  All in all, it appeared that the Cannings were relying on the decision issued in In re Pratt without appreciating the differences in the two situations.

There are many lessons that can be learned by In re Canning, but one is that there is no guarantee you will be able to shed ownership of a secured asset in bankruptcy.  Another may be that if you seek to rely on a court decision in your case, to pay close attention to the reasoning that supports it and think hard about whether those same reasons exist in your situation.  Finally, it may be to appreciate the commitment home ownership is.

There is much more to this subject matter and every consumer should seek the best counsel they can.  In the event that you are facing foreclosure or a possible bankruptcy and want to try for the best outcome, feel free to contact us.